

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GABORO 01304 01 OF 02 101413Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 MC-02 EUR-12 ISO-00 AID-05 IGA-02 OMB-01
EB-07 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02
SS-15 USIA-06 EPG-02 /094 W
-----101648Z 018955 /41

P R 101225Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0051
INFO AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY DARESSALAAM POUCH
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO POUCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GABORONE 1304

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, UK, US, SF, BC
SUBJECT: BOTSWANA REQUEST FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE; THIRD COUNTRY
INVOLVEMENT: THE UK AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

REF: A. GABORONE 1296; B. GABORONE 1290

NOTE: THIS IS PART III OF A THREE-PART TELEGRAM ON
BOTSWANA'S REQUEST FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE (REFTELS BEING PARTIS
I AND II).

1. Q: HOW MUCH DOES THE GOB THINK THE REQUESTED MILITARY
EQUIPMENT WILL COST?

A: THE GOB HAS GIVEN US NO COST ESTIMATE. WE ARE TRYING
TO ASCERTAIN WHAT ITS PRIORITIES ARE FROM A REQUEST LIST
COVERING ITS TOTAL NEEDS. WE EXPECT TO HAVE A FIGURE SOON.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GABORO 01304 01 OF 02 101413Z

WE CAN SAY EVEN NOW THAT, IF WE CONSIDER NON-LETHAL
EQUIPMENT IN THE BROADEST SENSE, I.E., INCLUDING JEEPS,
RADIOS, BLANK AMMO, MINE DETECTORS, NIGHT VIEWING DE-
VICES, ETC., THE COST WOULD BE SOME \$2,800,000, PLUS
FREIGHT.

2. Q: HOW MUCH DOES THE FARAH REPORT ESTIMATE THE BDF

WILL COST?

A: THE FARAH MISSION REPORT ESTIMATES THAT THE PLANNED EXPANSION OF THE BOTSWANA DEFENSE FORCE (CALLED THE POLICE MOBILE UNIT IN THE REPORT) WILL HAVE A TOTAL COST OF \$17,800,000 IN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES (CAMPS, VEHICLES, ARMS AND EQUIPMENT) PLUS AN ANNUAL RECURRENT COST OF \$3,600,000. THE REPORT MAKES CLEAR THAT THESE COSTS WOULD BE MET BY GOB INTERNAL RESOURCES.

3. Q: IS BOTSWANA ASKING FOR GRANTS OR CREDITS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT?

A: ALTHOUGH THE GOB NATURALLY WOULD PREFER GRANTS, IN DISCUSSING ITS REQUEST WITH RANKING OFFICIALS, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT FMS CREDITS WOULD BE THE MOST FAVORABLE POSSIBLE TERMS, WITH COMMERCIAL PURCHASES AN ALTERNATIVE.

4. Q: IF WE DO NOT APPROVE FMS CREDITS, WILL BOTSWANA BE WILLING AND ABLE TO PURCHASE THE EQUIPMENT IN THE U.S.?

A: WITHOUT CREDITS, THE GOB WOULD FIND IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN ARMS IN THE QUANTITIES IT WANTS. IF DENIED CREDITS BY THE USG, BOTSWANA WOULD PROBABLY TURN TO THE UK FOR LIMITED COMMERCIAL PURCHASES. SUCH IS THE STATE OF MIND HERE, IN THE FACE OF RHODESIAN ACTIONS AND DISPUTING ZIMBABWEAN NATIONALIST FACTIONS, THAT WE BELIEVE THE GOB WOULD NOT CONFINE ITS SEARCH TO CREDITS BUT WOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF OUTRIGHT GRANTS OF EQUIPMENT FROM OTHER SOURCES, ALL OF WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GABORO 01304 01 OF 02 101413Z

ARE BELIEVED TO BE COMMUNIST. (EXCEPT FOR THE UK, THERE IS NO GOB INTEREST IN OR CONNECTION WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN SOURCES.)

5. Q: WHAT EFFECT WILL INCREASED MILITARY EXPENDITURES FOR CASH PURCHASES OR MILITARY DEBT SERVICE HAVE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND PROGRAMS?

A: ALTHOUGH CASH PURCHASE, OR EVEN DEBT SERVICING OF THE EXPANDED MAY SHOPPING LIST WOULD INCREASE THE FARAH MISSION'S ESTIMATES BY PERHAPS 5 TO 10 MILLION DOLLARS, THIS IS AN UNKNOWN AND CANNOT REALLY BE FACTORED INTO OUR ANSWER, OTHER THAN IN THE MOST INEXACT TERMS. THE FARAH MISSION REPORT STATES THAT THE GOB BUDGETED \$39.5 MILLION FOR NORMAL DEVELOPMENT FROM DOMESTIC RESOURCES FOR THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN. THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE ESTIMATE (ALSO FARAH'S) OF TOTAL CAPITAL AND CURRENT COST FOR DEFENSE FOR THE FIRST THREE (3) YEARS IS \$28.6 MILLION. OF THIS, GOB HAS BUDGETED ABOUT \$2.2 MILLION UNDER THE "POLICE" RUBRIC

IN THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF THE 1976-1981 DEVELOPMENT PLAN. A TOTAL OF \$26.4 MILLION IS THUS EXPECTED TO BE DIVERTED FROM BOTSWANA'S CONTRIBUTION TO ITS DEVELOPMENT BUDGET OF \$39.5 MILLION. THE AMOUNT TO BE DIVERTED TO DEFENSE IS THUS ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF THE RESOURCES EXPECTED TO BE AVAILABLE FOR DEVELOPMENT DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF THE PLAN FROM BOTH GOB AND EXTERNAL DONORS (TOTAL \$174 MILLION).

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GABORO 01304 02 OF 02 101525Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 MC-02 AID-05 IGA-02 OMB-01
EB-07 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02
SS-15 USIA-06 EPG-02 /094 W
-----101649Z 020182 /41

P R 101225Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0052
INFO AMCONSUL CPE TOWN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY DARESSLAAM POUCH
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO POUCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GABORONE 1304

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

THIS DIVERSION OF 15 PERCENT DOES NOT STRIKE US AS A CRIPPLING BLOW TO DEVELOPMENT, E.G., WHEN COMPARED WITH THE ENORMOUS DIVERSIONS FOR DEFENSE UNDERTAKEN BY MANY OTHER COUNTRIES. GIVEN THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE FARAH MISSION REPORT, THERE IS SOME CONFIDENCE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THE GOB REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN FILLING THIS HIATUS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCING. THEREFORE, BARRING SOME CRIPPLING ECONOMIC CRISIS CAUSED BY DROUGHT OR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, THERE ARE GOOD INDICATIONS THAT THE GOB WOULD, WITH THE HELP OF DONORS' GRANTS AND CREDITS, HAVE THE RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR PROJECTED DEFENSE SPENDING.

6. Q: IF RATHER THAN EXTEND FMS CREDITS WE OPT FOR
INCREASED ECONOMIC AID (OVER WHAT WE HAVE PLANNED), WHAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GABORO 01304 02 OF 02 101525Z

PROJECTS SHOULD BE CONSIDER?

A: IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY, WE SHOULD GIVE VERY
SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO: (A) HELPING TO FINANCE
CONTINGENCY RAILROAD EQUIPMENT, EITHER FOR THE EXISTING
NORTH-SOUTH RAILROAD OR POSSIBLY A NEW EAST-WEST ONE;
(B) GRAIN PURCHASE AND STORAGE; (C) ACCESS ROADS IN THE RHODESIAN
BORDER AREA; AND (D) REFUGEE CAMPS, SCHOOLS AND SUBSISTENCE.
THESE ARE LISTED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF PRIORITY.

7. Q: HOW SERIOUS IS THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF SLOW
DELIVERY ON SOME OF OUR AID PROGRAMS?

A: SERIOUS ENOUGH THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF AID AS
A RELIABLE SOURCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND REFUGEE (EMERGENCY)
ASSISTANCE ALIKE IS INCREASINGLY QUESTIONED. ANTICIPATED
DELAYS DUE TO AID PROCEDURES HAVE LED US TO CHANNEL REF-
UGEE-RELATED RELIEF (EVEN LARGE CAPITAL PROJECTS) THROUGH
THE UNHCR. AID PROJECTS -- WHILE DESIRABLE IN THEMSELVES --
LOSE MUCH OF THEIR BENEFICIAL EFFECT TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS
IF NOT IMPLEMENTED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. WE BELIEVE
THERE IS A CLEAR LIMIT TO THE DELAYS THE GOB WILL ACCEPT
IN REGARD TO SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE.

8. Q: WOULD U.S. INTERESTS BE BETTER SERVED BY FOCUSING
OUR AID ONLY ON THE ECONOMIC SECTOR?

A: OUR INTEREST IN THIS REGION IS LARGELY POLITICAL.
WHILE IN ECONOMIC TERMS THE OFF-SETTING EFFECT OF EQUIVA-
LENT ECONOMIC AID MAY BENEFIT THE GOB AS MUCH AS DIRECT
MILITARY ASSISTANCE, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE DIFFICULT TO
CONVINCE THE GOB THAT IT WOULD NOT HAVE RECEIVED THE
SAME ECONOMIC AID IN ANY CASE. (STATISTICS ON THIS
SPECULATIVE POINT ARE UNLIKELY TO IMPRESS ANYONE.) IN
ADDITION, RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE
IS MEASURABLE IN TERMS OF IMMEDIACY AND INVOLVES TANGI-
BLE ITEMS. THE GOB WOULD CLEARLY FIND A PROMPT RESPONSE
CONVINCING AS CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF OUR COMMITMENT TO
BOTSWANA'S SURVIVAL AS A STABLE, NON-RACIAL DEMOCRACY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GABORO 01304 02 OF 02 101525Z

DEEPLY COMMITTED TO RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

9. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED

USUN MESSAGE REPORTS THAT MINEXTAFF MOGWE EXPRESSED DIS-
APPOINTMENT WITH RESULTS OF JUNE 6 PLEDGING CONFERENCE
AND WISHES U.S. FUNDS MIGHT BE DIVERTED TO "OTHER EMER-
GENCY PROBLEMS" (I.E., MILITARY ASSISTANCE). THIS
ATTITUDE WAS REPEATED BY PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
SECRETARY TIBONE IN JUNE 9 CONVERSATION WITH DCM; HE
EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR U.S. CONTRIBUTION BUT DIS-
APPOINTMENT THAT IT MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN USED "FOR OTHER
PROBRAMS". WE INTERPRET THESE INDEPENDENT COMMENTS AS
REFLECTING GROWING GOB CONCERN REGARDING SOURCES
OF FUNDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. IF WE SOUGHT TO INVENT
SOME DRAMATIC DEVICE TO ENFORCE THE BURDEN OF THESE
MESSAGES (WHICH WE ARE NOT), WE COULD HARDLY HAVE COME
UP WITH A BETTER ONE.

10. RECOMMENDATION: WE REPEAT ACTION REQUESTED IN
GABORONE 1290: THAT DEPARTMENT REVIEW GOB REQUEST FOR
SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND THAT WE SEEK A PRESIDENTIAL
DETERMINATION TO PERMIT FMS CREDITS TO BE USED FOR SALE OF
DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO BOTSWANA.
NORLAND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SECURITY, COMMUNISTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 10-Jun-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977GABORO01304
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770207-1159
Format: TEL
From: GABORONE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770670/aaaacjgj.tel
Line Count: 245
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: d5feed7f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 GABORONE 1296, 77 GABORONE 1290
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2203913
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BOTSWANA REQUEST FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE; THIRD COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT: THE UK AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
TAGS: PINS, MASS, UK, US, SF, BC
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/d5feed7f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009